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individual policy actions to take? To learn from
experience, we must be able to generalize and
determine what circumstances call for what
actions.
Second, for a central bank to achieve good
outcomes for the economy, private decisionmakers
need to understand monetary policy and form
sensible expectations about future policy actions.
Almost every decision firms and households
make depends in some way on expectations about
the future. Inflation expectations are of particular
concern to every central bank—or every respon-
sible central bank, anyway. For firms and house-
holds, what goods to buy and when to buy them,
the wages to pay and to accept, and the financial
commitments to make depend on expectations
about the price level in the future. Ideally, we take
for granted the stability of the purchasing power
of money and do not consciously consider infla-
tion expectations in our decisions. The ideal state
of taking for granted the purchasing power of
money is incredibly important for a market sys-
tem, and many things change when we start to
incorporate consciously likely inflation in every
decision. Equally important, our everyday deci-
sions depend on expectations about the state of
the real economy—whether the economy will be
sagging or surging.
Outcomes for inflation and the real economy
depend in part on what the central bank does,
which in turn depends on central bank objectives.
All this is familiar ground from work in macro-
economics over the past 50 years, but I repeat it
so that I can tell a coherent story.
Much of my thinking over the past 10 years
has been devoted to this subject. What is the right
policy? That is, how should individual policy
I
have now attended my last FOMC meeting
and, once editing of the meeting minutes
is complete, I will no longer be a part of
the FOMC process. I am in a transition
period, soon to be an FOMC alum.
Nevertheless, before proceeding I want to
emphasize that the views I express here are mine
and do not necessarily reflect official positions
of the Federal Reserve System. I thank my col-
leagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
for their comments, but I retain full responsibility
for errors.
It is natural for me to be in a reflective mood.
My 10 years at the St. Louis Fed have been an
incredible experience. I am soon to become an
outside Fed watcher, as I was before coming to
St. Louis, but my perspective will be different.
That, in part, will be the subject of my remarks
this afternoon.
THE STRATEGY OF MONETARY
POLICY
One of the key lessons of the rational expec-
tations revolution in macroeconomics was that
we must think of every policy action as fitting
within a policy strategy. I’ll now drop the word
“strategy” to emphasize that a monetary policy
is the general mode of central behavior that deter-
mines individual policy actions, or settings of
the policy instruments. We need to think in terms
of a policy for two reasons. First, the central
bank—and every other decisionmaking body,
public or private—should not act on the basis of
whim. There must be some system of action, for,
otherwise, how could we possibly know whatactions be fit into a general policy and not be, or
appear to be, drawn at random? I have given a
number of speeches on this theme. We clearly
have made progress in thinking about policy
actions in this general way, although there is a
long way to go to make the policy reaction func-
tion more precise both to guide policy actions
themselves and to make those actions more pre-
dictable to the markets.
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COMMUNICATIONS
When I came to the St. Louis Fed, I was well-
prepared for my FOMC responsibilities in most
respects. I knew a lot about monetary economics
and monetary history. What I did not know was
the art of communicating with the press and
general public. The professional literature in
economics was full of insights into the impor-
tance of private-sector expectations about mone-
tary policy but essentially silent on how those
expectations were formed, except for the assump-
tion that expectations would not be systematically
wrong and would converge to being correct even-
tually. Once I started fielding questions from the
press after my speeches and talking informally
before a wide range of audiences, I was part of the
process of trying to establish correct expectations.
My general approach has been to speak pri-
marily about the policy process rather than the
specific situation facing the FOMC at its next
meeting. I try to think of myself as speaking to
portfolio managers who have a medium-term
horizon rather than to traders who have a horizon
measured in hours or a few days. I do not dispar-
age traders—they perform an important function.
Obviously, I have had internal information that
would be of interest to traders but it would be
entirely inappropriate—indeed illegal—to dis-
close confidential FOMC information.
Traders, portfolio managers and many others
always want to know my forecast of what will
happen at the upcoming FOMC meeting. My stan-
dard answer is that I do not forecast monetary
policy decisions—my job is to participate in
making those decisions. I confess that, initially,
this response was something of a dodge, because
I usually had a pretty good idea weeks in advance
of what my own position at a meeting would be.
However, over the years I have become impressed
by how often my own position would change even
in the days just before a meeting as a consequence
of the arrival of new information, including staff
analysis and sound arguments by my FOMC col-
leagues. It is not that my views are pushed this
way and that by arrival of the latest economic
data reports. What happens is that, from time to
time, compelling new information does arrive. I
hope that my policy outlook was stable even as
my view on the appropriate policy action might
change in the light of incoming data.
Thinking through the matter led me to a bit of
research. Working with Bob Rasche, the St. Louis
Fed research director, I had already studied the
accuracy of market expectations about FOMC
decisions using data from the federal funds futures
market the day before each FOMC meeting. Given
that those futures market forecasts have proven
to be quite accurate, an obvious question was
forecast accuracy longer in advance. Bob and I
studied futures market predictions of the fed funds
rate three and six months in advance and found
that the accuracy was pretty low. The reason
these forecasts have not been very good is that
new information arrives that calls for a changed
expectation on the monetary policy setting, both
for the markets and for the FOMC. I not only
became more aware of the need for me to keep
my mind open but also thought it important to
explain to my audiences how the policy process
worked to be responsive to new information.
During the past 10 years, the FOMC has often
discussed the nature of the policy statement to be
issued at the conclusion of each policy meeting.
A recurrent issue is the extent of forward guidance
incorporated in the statement. When I joined the
FOMC in March 1998, the Committee’s practice
was to release a statement only following a meet-
ing at which it changed the federal funds rate
target. The Committee released meeting minutes
shortly after the following meeting.
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2For some years, the Committee’s practice had
been to adopt a statement to be included in the
minutes about symmetry in the directive. The
directive issued to the Open Market Desk might
be symmetrical, or have a bias toward either eas-
ing or tightening policy. By 1998, the bias had no
practical effect on Desk operations but did indi-
cate to those who read the minutes that the Com-
mittee might be more inclined in the future to
raise the funds rate target than lower it, or vice
versa.
The minutes of the meeting of May 19, 1998,
released in early July, contained this passage,
which was typical of the symmetry language in
1998 and earlier years: “All the members who
intended to vote for an unchanged policy at this
meeting supported the retention of a directive
that was biased toward restraint. In their view,
current developments did not call for any policy
action, at least at this meeting, but because they
felt the risks were tilted in the direction of rising
inflation, a policy tightening move, possibly in
the near future, was a likely though not an
inevitable prospect.” Two FOMC members, both
favoring an increase in the federal funds target
rate, dissented.
Although the FOMC was apparently on the
edge of raising the target fed funds rate in the
spring and summer of 1998, the environment
then changed rapidly because of the financial
market turmoil created by Long-Term Capital
Management. The focus of the Committee changed
from a predominant concern over the risk of rising
inflation to the financial turmoil, and the Com-
mittee proceeded to reduce the target fed funds
rate by a total of 75 basis points in three 25-basis-
points steps. The previously stated bias toward
tightening did not complicate the Committee’s
action to deal with financial turmoil; I recount
the episode to illustrate how quickly conditions
can change, overturning an earlier forecast of the
likely direction of the target fed funds rate.
The FOMC continued to discuss the merits
of providing formal guidance to the market on
the likely direction of future policy. At its
December 1998 meeting, the Committee decided
to release a statement whenever its view of the
balance of risks changed materially.1 The first
such statement came in May 1999, when the
Committee left the funds rate target unchanged
but indicated a bias toward raising the target in
the future. The market did react to that statement—
the Committee thought the market over-reacted.
The Committee raised the target by 25 basis
points at its June 1999 meeting and by another
25 basis points at its August meeting but did not
express a directional bias in either of the state-
ments accompanying these policy actions.
At the time, I remember that I was very much
in favor of the FOMC providing whatever guid-
ance it could on its thinking about future adjust-
ments in the fed funds rate target. If the Committee
were on the edge of raising the target, for example,
why not reveal that information? Then the market
could observe incoming information and decide
whether strong data reports might complete the
case for raising the target. That way of thinking




1 This passage was in the minutes of the FOMC meeting of December 22, 1998: “Disclosure Policy. The members also discussed various issues
relating to the timing and manner of releasing information about the Committee’s policy decisions. A range of views was expressed, as at
earlier meetings, on the desirability of releasing a statement routinely not only after those meetings at which there was a change in the stance
of policy but also after meetings where the Committee altered its view of the direction of possible policy actions during the intermeeting
period. Members who favored more announcements believed that such disclosure, by providing more information on the Committee’s views
of the risks in the economic outlook, generally would allow financial market prices to reflect more accurately the likely future stance of mone-
tary policy. However, other members were concerned that such announcements often would provoke market reactions. As a consequence,
the Committee would become less willing to change the symmetry in the directive, and a policy of immediate release might therefore have
adverse repercussions on the Committee’s decision-making. Nonetheless, the members decided to implement the previously stated policy of
releasing, on an infrequent basis, an announcement immediately after certain FOMC meetings when the stance of monetary policy remained
unchanged. Specifically, the Committee would do so on those occasions when it wanted to communicate to the public a major shift in its
views about the balance of risks or the likely direction of future policy. Such announcements would not be made after every change in the
symmetry of the directive, but only when it seemed important for the public to be aware of an important shift in the members’ views. On the
basis of experience with such announcements, the Committee would evaluate later whether further changes in its approach to disclosures
would be desirable.”The language to express this idea was changed
from policy “symmetry,” which could include a
bias toward raising or reducing the funds rate
target, to the balance-of-risks language used more
recently but expressing much the same idea.
Several problems arose. One was that it was hard
for the market to determine when incoming data
made the case to change the funds rate target as
suggested in the balance-of-risks statement.
Another was that sometimes the data came in the
other way, in which case the Committee might
want to change the target in the opposite direc-
tion to that suggested earlier. In principle, there
should be no problem here because the Commit-
tee made clear that the policy stance was always
contingent on incoming information. Still, it just
seemed awkward, to me at least, to change the
funds rate target in the opposite direction to that
indicated only a short time before.
I also became troubled by the following argu-
ment. If current economic conditions were such
to suggest a high probability that future economic
conditions would justify a future increase in the
funds rate target, why not just raise the rate at
the current meeting? Given lags in the effects of
policy actions, the current policy had to be based
on the future outlook. On the other hand, if the
probability were low, would it serve the cause of
good communication to state a bias? Wouldn’t it
be more helpful to work harder to articulate the
conditions under which the Committee might
change the target—to explain in more detail the
nature of the policy rule or response function?2
Another problem with forward policy guid-
ance was that a slow accumulation of information
sometimes made the prior balance-of-risks lan-
guage out of date, but it was not easy to take it out
of the statement without sending a message, or
seeming to, that a future policy adjustment in the
other direction was contemplated. This problem
arose in 2006. In August 2006, the Committee kept
the funds rate target unchanged, after increasing
it by 25 basis points at each of its previous 17
meetings. However, the statement indicated a
bias toward a further increase by saying this:
“Nonetheless, the Committee judges that some
inflation risks remain. The extent and timing of
any additional firming that may be needed to
address these risks will depend on the evolution
of the outlook for both inflation and economic
growth, as implied by incoming information.”
Just ahead of the August meeting, the market had
assigned a probability of about 0.8 on an FOMC
target fed funds rate of 5.25 percent and a proba-
bility of about 0.2 on a target rate of 5.5 percent.3
Just after the August 2006 FOMC meeting, the
market assigned these probabilities to the FOMC
decision at its forthcoming September meeting: a
target of 5.25 percent had a probability of about
0.78, a target of 5.5 percent had a probability of
about 0.2 percent, and a target of 5.75 percent had
a probability of about 0.02 percent. Although the
FOMC retained the language that “firming may
be needed” at subsequent meetings, over time the
market lowered its probability that the FOMC
would in fact raise the target rate. Ahead of the
FOMC meeting of January 30-31, 2007, the market
placed essentially zero probability on any target
rate above the prevailing rate of 5.25 percent.
At its meeting of March 20-21, 2007, the
Committee dropped the language referring to
possible firming. Doing so made little difference
given that the market had discounted the possi-
bility of firming for some time.
I have recounted several of these episodes in
some detail to illustrate the general issue. As a
consequence of observing this process for 10
years, I have concluded that an FOMC attempt to
provide forward guidance in the policy statement
causes more communications difficulties than it
solves. A key reason is that the economy is sub-
2 These considerations and others led to two speeches, “Monetary Policy Rules?” (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March/April 1999,
81(2)) and “The Fed’s Monetary Policy Rule” (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, January/February 2006, 88(1)).
3 I am relying on the probability estimates reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland derived from trading in options on federal funds
futures [http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/policy/fedfunds/archives.cfm]. I have read the probabilities off the Cleveland Fed charts;
these approximations are close enough for my present discussion.
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4ject to more shocks and reversals than one might
think. These shocks sometimes require more fre-
quent policy actions than I would have thought
likely when I came to St. Louis. At a minimum,
changing economic conditions change the likeli-
hood that the FOMC will want to adjust the fed
funds target in the direction previously thought.
Directional language tends to remain in the FOMC
policy statement beyond the time it applies and
removing the language creates the possibility of
miscommunication. Every change in the policy
statement leads naturally to market questions as
to what the change means and whether the change
is meant to provide a hint about the future direc-
tion of policy. To my mind, every time new lan-
guage is inserted into the policy statement, there
needs to be as much thought given as to how to
exit from the language as to the rationale for
inserting it.
I know that market participants are hungry
for insight into the FOMC’s thinking and into the
likelihood of future adjustments in the target
federal funds rate. My judgment is that, most of
the time, the Committee cannot provide what
the market wants because the Committee itself is
not clairvoyant. No one knows how the economy
is going to evolve and how events will change
the appropriate setting of the federal funds target
rate. Most of the time over the past 10 years I had
hunches about the policy direction I would be
advocating at the next FOMC meeting, but
“hunches” really is the right word. I had hunches
and not settled convictions. Furthermore, the
more I reflected and the more experience I accu-
mulated, the more I realized how frequently sur-
prise changes in conditions required that I change
my hunches. I should not be misinterpreted as
saying that I necessarily changed my view on the
appropriate setting of the fed funds rate target.
But when the information on which my prior
hunch was based changed significantly, I had to
start over, in a sense, to figure out whether the
new information required a change in the policy
stance.
SHOCKS AND MORE SHOCKS
Ten years ago, my baseline approach was to
think of the economy as growing along its full-
employment growth path, or converging to that
path, except when interrupted by occasional
shocks. These shocks might have negative impli-
cations, like 9/11, or positive ones like the surge
in productivity growth starting in about 1995. My
view about shocks has changed: the shocks are
continual and not occasional. Over the past 10
years, there have been many more months in
which the economy was being hit by substantial
surprises, or adjusting to them, than tranquil
months. Crude oil prices have fluctuated over a
tremendous range, as have equity prices and now
home prices. Financial markets were shaken by
Long-Term Capital Management, Enron and
WorldCom and now the subprime mortgage mess.
The terrorist attacks of September 2001 and then
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 created uncer-
tainty. The Y2K effort was substantial—in the
event there was no event, but before the event
there was uncertainty and risk.
So, surprises are normal and their implica-
tions for central bank practice are often—indeed
ordinarily—unclear ahead of time. I try to sepa-
rate surprises requiring central bank responses
from those in which a response would be unhelp-
ful. Market adjustments do deal with many sur-
prises—markets are superb in this respect. Price
signals alter decisions and equilibrate changes
in goods supplies and demands.
The abstract framework I sketched at the out-
set provides considerable guidance. The question
is always whether a policy response to a shock
will help in achieving the goals of price level
stability and a real economy close to its long-run
growth path determined by productivity and thrift.
Every policy action should be viewed as being
logically derived from the general policy and the
current facts. If a policy response itself would be
a shock, because it could not be anticipated from
the general policy rule, then that creates in my




I have concentrated my remarks on monetary
policy issues because that is the subject that has
taken most of my time over the past 10 years. But
there has been a lot more to my St. Louis Fed job
than monetary policy.
I knew little about management when I came
to St. Louis, at least in any formal sense. Never-
theless, the management side of being a CEO has
turned out to be very interesting to me. I have
learned a lot about good management practice,
including the role of a strong board of directors,
internal audit and other control processes, and
the task of staying in touch with employees in
all parts of the Bank at all levels. The St. Louis
Fed has roughly 1,000 employees. I find it mind-
boggling that successful CEOs of much larger
organizations are able to stay in touch with all
the firm’s employees. I’ve used personal appear-
ances before large groups of employees, internal
media and selective meetings with small groups
of employees. Although it is impossible to meet
all employees in small groups, word spreads from
the meetings that do take place. At least that has
been my strategy.
Efforts to stay in touch with employees are
important to provide clear expectations, motiva-
tion and promote a sound corporate culture.
Although the Federal Reserve has a culture of
very high integrity, reinforcing that culture is
obviously worthwhile. The problem the Federal
Reserve faces, in common with other not-for-
profit firms, is that employees do not always push
hard enough to get things done. We tend to suffer
from paralysis by analysis and excessively high
risk-aversion. My sense is that the St. Louis Fed
has moved in the right direction in recent years.
There is a lot more innovative activity at the
Bank than outsiders can observe.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
All aspects of my time at the St. Louis Fed
have been interesting and rewarding. I have not
had anything to do as burdensome as my exam-
grading chores when I was an academic.
I leave the Fed at the end of next month with
a deep appreciation of the competence and energy
level of Fed employees. The Fed knows what it
is doing, up to the limits imposed by the state of
knowledge in economics. Professional standards
are the very highest. People work hard and never
let politics interfere with decisions. Simply put,
this has been a fabulous experience for me.
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